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Abstract
In the setting of fuzzy choice functions
(Georgescu [6]), we explore the relationships
among known and new consistency axioms. Then
we define the notion of sequential application of
fuzzy choice functions, and investigate its nor-
mative implications. The Fuzzy Arrow Axiom
is preserved by this sequential procedure, which
ensures that full-rationality is preserved too.
Keywords: Choice function, Fuzzy choice function,
Fuzzy Arrow Axiom.
1. Introduction
In the act of choice, rationality is a central issue
that has raised many controversial analysis. There
is a trend in the literature that considers choice as
rational only when derives from well-behaved pref-
erences. Transitivity of preference is the paradig-
matic rational principle to obey, and it is assumed
by many descriptive theories of decision making.
However experimental evidence contradicts this po-
sition, as recognized as soon as in May [9] and Tver-
sky [12].
Therefore other authors attempted to study the
object of choice –formally, choice functions– and dis-
cuss which possible rationality properties could be
tested without any reference to an underlying pref-
erence. As soon as in Uzawa [13] the term “rational
choice function” means a choice function satisfying
axioms of rational behavior. Nevertheless the idea
that these axioms can be used to test the model
by optimization of nice preferences with the observ-
ables (the actual choices) is central in the analysis
of economic or abstract decisions (cf., Arrow [1] and
Sen [10] among others).
If we recognize that social phenomena involve in-
trinsically vague concepts then we can perform more
extensive studies in the lines highlighted above. In
this work we are interested in fuzzy choice functions
as defined in Georgescu [6].
We explore the relationships among known and
new consistency axioms for this setting. Then we
define the new concept of sequential fuzzy choice
functions, and explore its normative implications.
Our main findings are two when the minimum t-
norm is assumed. Firstly, a foremost consistency
axiom known as Fuzzy Arrow Axiom is preserved
by this sequential procedure. This implies that
the same is true for full-rationality (i.e., for the
existence of a well-behaved fuzzy relation that G-
rationalizes the fuzzy choice).
Secondly, when the sequential application of
G-rational fuzzy choice functions produces a G-
rational fuzzy choice function, the fuzzy preference
that G-rationalizes their sequential application is
identified.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2
we recall some preliminary definitions and concepts
from the crisp literature. In Section 3 we introduce
the fuzzy set theory and discuss the connection be-
tween some consistency conditions in this context.
In Section 4 we present the results obtained for se-
quential choices. We conclude in Section 5.
2. The Crisp Case
The remote antecedent of our investigation is the
following model of abstract choice.
The collection of all situations that a decision-
maker can conceivably face are represented by B, a
nonempty domain of nonempty subsets of X. That
is, if P(X) denotes the set of all subsets of X then
we require ∅ 6= B ⊆ P(X) and S 6= ∅ for all S ∈ B.
For convenience sometimes we drop brackets, e.g.,
the set {x} can be represented as x.
Choices (among the subsets in B) are captured by
the following notion:
Definition 1 A decisive choice correspondence on
(X,B) is a map C : B → P(X) such that C(S) ⊆ S
and C(S) 6= ∅ for all S ∈ B.
Henceforth we simply refer to decisive choice cor-
respondences as choice functions. They attach with
each feasible set in the domain B, the set of alterna-
tives that are either potentially or actually chosen
by the decision-maker.
Particular specifications of this abstract model
call for suitably adapted terms. For example in
Economics, demand theory is concerned with de-
mand functions or demand correspondences, whose
domain is constituted by budget sets.
2.1. Consistency properties
A good deal of the literature on choice functions is
devoted to study properties of choice that embody
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rationality in various forms and their relationships.
We proceed to list some rationality or consistency
properties of choice that we are interested in.
The strongest version of the consistency axioms
that we define is the crisp Arrow Axiom (AA),
which demands that for any S, T ∈ B, the following
implication holds:
S ⊆ T ⇒ either S∩C(T ) = ∅ or S∩C(T ) = C(S) .
Other weaker properties used to capture rationality
in the context of crisp choice functions follow:
Definition 2 The choice function C satisfies:
• The Chernoff condition, also CH, if for any
S, T ∈ B such that S ⊆ T we have
C(T ) ∩ S ⊆ C(S).
• The Superset property, also SUP, if for all
S, T ∈ B such that S ⊆ T it is the case that
C(T ) ⊆ C(S)⇒ C(T ) = C(S) .
• Property γ (cf., Sen [10]), also γ, if for any
collection {Mi}i∈I of subsets of B the following
holds true:
x ∈ C(Mi) for all i ∈ I entails x ∈ C(∪i∈IMi) .
This property is stronger than the Concor-
dance property which only establishes that
C(S) ∩ C(T ) ⊆ C(S ∪ T ) throughout.
• The Binariness property, also B, if for any
S ∈ B we have: x ∈ S and x ∈ C(x, y) for all
y ∈ S implies x ∈ C(S).
2.2. Relationships among consistency
properties
In the crisp case there are implications among the
properties in Subsection 2.1, which are represented
by Figure 1. Neither of them can be reversed. More-
over, there is no connection among the properties on
the right, except for the ones shown between Prop-
erty γ and Binariness and Property γ and Concor-
dance.
Arrow Axiom⇒

Chernoff condition
Superset property
Property γ ⇒ Binariness
⇓
Concordance
Figure 1: Implications among consistency proper-
ties of crisp choice functions.
The relationships among the consistency prop-
erties mentioned above and the possibility that
the choice function can be rationalized through
some specific procedure constitute another impor-
tant branch in choice theory, especially in revealed
preference theory. These relationships and char-
acterizations rely on the structure of the domain
of subsets for which choices are defined or known.
Particularly, we may be bound by the following con-
straints:
Definition 3 Condition H is satisfied if B contains
all non-empty finite subset of X. Condition WH
is satisfied if B contains at least all the pairs and
triplets of alternatives.
To grasp the importance of assumption H we re-
call that already Arrow [1] emphasized in his in-
sightful analysis on the theory of consumer’s de-
mand: “the demand-function point of view would
be greatly simplified if the range over which the
choice functions are considered to be determined is
broadened to include all finite sets” and also: “re-
quiring the choice functions to be defined for finite
sets is thoroughly consistent with the intuitive ar-
guments underlying revealed preference. It should
also be observed that any hope of using experimen-
tal methods for studying preference will require in-
ferring from choices on finite sets to choices on in-
finite ones.” Even under assumption WH, he shows
among other issues that Samuelson’s weak axiom of
revealed preference is equivalent to the strong ax-
iom of revealed preference and to Arrow’s Axiom.
And that they are equivalent to the property that
the choice function is rationalizable in the most sat-
isfactory manner: there exists a complete and tran-
sitive relation Q such that for each S ∈ B, C(S) is
the set of maximizers of R in S, this is,
C(S) = {x ∈ S | (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S} .
3. The Fuzzy Case: a Study in Consistency
We now move forward to the fuzzy context. We
begin with the analysis of the issues that Section 2
motivates. The main concept that we need to es-
tablish is the following (cf., Georgescu [6, Definition
5.13]):
Definition 4 Let X be a non-empty set and B a
non empty set of non-zero fuzzy subsets of X.
A fuzzy choice function on (X,B) is a mapping
C : B → F(X) such that for each S ∈ B, C(S) is
non-zero and C(S) ⊆ S, i.e., C(S)(x) ≤ S(x) for
all x ∈ X.
S(x) is called the availability degree of the alter-
native x in S or if S represents a vague criterion,
it captures the degree to which x verifies the crite-
rion. Definition 4 includes the class of fuzzy choice
functions originally studied by Banerjee [2].
In order to define consistency properties of fuzzy
choice functions, we first need to recall the concepts
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that permit to use intersection, union, implications
and inclusions in the fuzzy context.
The intersection of fuzzy sets is usually defined by
the minimum t-norm, and we follow this tradition.
A t-norm is a binary operation ∗ on [0, 1] that is
commutative, associative, monotone and has 1 as
neutral element. The most popular t-norm is the
minimum. Thus given two fuzzy sets A and B, we
set (A ∩ B)(x) = min(A(x), B(x)) for all x ∈ X.
The union of these two sets is defined using the
maximum: (A ∪ B)(x) = max(A(x), B(x)) for all
x ∈ X. T-norms are used to model conjunction in
fuzzy logic too.
Given a t-norm ∗, the (residual) implication as-
sociated to ∗ is the relation →∗ defined as
x→∗ y = sup{z ∈ [0, 1] | x ∗ z ≤ y} .
The biresiduum of ∗ is defined by
x↔∗ y = min(x→∗ y, y →∗ x) .
If no confusion is possible, we will just write→ and
↔ . For the minimum t-norm,
x→ y =
{
1 , if x ≤ y ,
y , otherwise.
and
x↔ y =
{
1 , if x = y ,
min{x, y} , otherwise.
Given a left-continuous t-norm ∗, the degree of
inclusion of the set S in the set T is
I(S, T ) =
∧
x∈X
(S(x)→ T (x)) ,
and the degree of equality between S and T is
E(S, T ) = min(I(S, T ), I(T, S)) .
For the minimum t-norm, the expressions above boil
down to
I(S, T ) =
∧
{T (x) : x ∈ X,S(x) > T (x)}
and
E(S, T ) =
∧
{S(x) ∧ T (x) : x ∈ X,S(x) 6= T (x)}
A property of the degree of inclusion that facili-
tates the proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 below
is the following: if T1 ⊆ T2 and S are three fuzzy
subsets of a set X, then
E(S, T1) ≤ I(S, T1) ≤ I(S, T2) . (1)
For a more extensive reference about properties
of the usual operations with fuzzy sets the reader
may consult [3, 4].
3.1. Consistency of fuzzy choice functions:
some new axioms
Let X be a non-empty set and B a non empty set of
non-zero fuzzy subsets of X. We proceed to define
some known and new axioms of consistency for C,
a fuzzy choice function on (X,B).
Georgescu [6, subsection 6.5] extended the Arrow
Axiom to the context of fuzzy choice functions as
follows:
Definition 5 The fuzzy choice function C satisfies
the Fuzzy Arrow Axiom (FAA) if for any S, T ∈
B and x ∈ X we have
I(S, T ) ∗ S(x) ∗ C(T )(x) ≤ E(S ∩ C(T ), C(S)) .
Analogously, we now propose to extend the con-
sistency properties of choice functions in Defini-
tion 2, in the following terms:
Definition 6 The fuzzy choice function C satisfies:
• The fuzzy Chernoff condition, also FCH, if
for any S, T ∈ B,
I(S, T ) ≤ I(C(T ) ∩ S,C(S)) .
• The fuzzy Superset property, also FSUP,
if for all S, T ∈ B it holds that
I(S, T ) ∗ I(C(T ), C(S)) ≤ E(C(T ), C(S)) .
• The fuzzy Concordance property, also FC,
if for any S, T ∈ B such that S ∪ T ∈ B, the
following holds true for all x ∈ X:
C(S)(x) ∗ C(T )(x) ≤ C(S ∪ T )(x) .
• The fuzzy Property γ (cf., Sen [10]), also
Fγ, if for any collection {Mi}i∈I of subsets of
B such that ∪i∈IMi ∈ B the following holds
true for all x ∈ X:
C(M1)(x) ∗ · · · ∗ C(Mn)(x) ≤ C(∪i∈IMi)(x) .
• The fuzzy Binariness property, also FB if
for any S ∈ B we have:
S(x) ∗
∧
y∈X
(S(y)→ C({x, y})(x)) ≤ C(S)(x) ,
for all x ∈ X .
This property is called Fγ2 in Georgescu [6, p.
132].
Remark 1 The following two remarks concerning
other fuzzifications of the Chernoff condition are in
order.
1. Georgescu [6, subsection 6.5] defines a weaker
version of the fuzzy Chernoff condition, that we
abbreviate as FCH∗. In her statement FCH∗
establishes that for any S, T ∈ B,
I(S, T ) ∗ S(x) ∗C(T )(x) ≤ I(C(T ) ∩ S,C(S)) .
It is clear that FCH implies FCH∗. We return
to this property later on in this paper.
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2. Georgescu [6] also defines a dual version of
FCH∗ that coupled with FCH∗ is trivially equiv-
alent to FAA. Similarly one could consider a
fuzzy dual Chernoff condition establishing
that for any S, T ∈ B,
I(S, T ) ≤ I(C(S), C(T ) ∩ S) .
However this property seems useless for norma-
tive analyses because it is not even implied by
FAA, as Counterexample 1 below proves.
As in the crisp analysis, in order to study the
main features of these new ideas we need to impose
properties on the structure of B. Here we follow the
direction of Definition 3.
For the purpose of extending condition H to the
fuzzy case, one can consider two options. The first
one was proposed by Georgescu [6, subsection 5.2]:
Definition 7 The fuzzy choice function C satisfies
• Condition H1 if all S and C(S) are normal
fuzzy sets, i.e., if for all S there exists an ele-
ment x ∈ X such that C(S)(x) = 1 .
• Condition H2 if B contains all the non-empty
crisp finite subsets of X, i.e., if B contains
f [X] = {[x1, . . . , xn] : n ≥ 1, x1, . . . , xn ∈ X}.
The following alternative possibility was proposed
by Martinetti et al. [8] and is less restrictive:
Definition 8 The fuzzy choice function C satisfies
• Condition WH1 if all S ∈ B, there exists
an element x ∈ X such that S(x) > 0 and
C(S)(x) = S(x) .
• Condition WH2 if B contains {x}, {x, y} and
{x, y, z} for all x, y, z ∈ X .
Provided that H1 and H2 hold true, the Fuzzy Ar-
row Axiom plays a crucial role in revealed preference
analysis. Under the minimum t-norm, Georgescu [6,
Theorem 6.40] shows the equivalence of FAA with
the fuzzy versions of the two most relevant axioms
in that contex, to wit, the Weak and the Strong
Axioms of Revealed Preference (i.e., WARP and
SARP respectively). And most importantly, it es-
tablishes the equivalence of any of these axioms with
the property that the choice function is full rational.
Recall that the fuzzy choice function C on (X,B)
is G-rational if there exists a fuzzy preference re-
lation Q on X such that for any S ∈ B, C(S) =
G(S,Q). In this regard, G(S,Q) generalizes to fuzzy
choice functions the notion of Q-greatest elements
according to the expression: for each x ∈ X,
G(S,Q)(x) = S(x) ∗
∧
y∈X
(S(y)→ Q(x, y))
In a more restricted sense, C is full-rational if there
exists a fuzzy relation Q on X that is reflexive,
∗-transitive and strongly total, and that verifies
C(S) = G(S,Q) for any S ∈ B.
3.2. Consistency in fuzzy choice: some
implications
We proceed to study possible connections between
the consistency axioms that we have stated in Sub-
section 3.1.
It will become apparent that conditions H1 an
H2 are more suitable to establish comparisons than
WH1 and WH2.
Henceforth we assume ∗ the minimum t-norm,
unless otherwise stated.
Observe that G-rationality trivially implies FB.
Since the Fuzzy Arrow Axiom implies G-rationality
in the presence of H1 and H2 as recalled above, it
is obvious that under such restrictions FAA implies
FB.
Lemma 1 below proves that the Fuzzy Arrow Ax-
iom implies the fuzzy Chernoff property irrespective
of the structure of B, both in our restrictive sense
and in Georgescu’s approach:
Lemma 1 If a fuzzy choice function C satisfies
FAA then it also satisfies FCH, hence FCH∗.
Despite this positive result, as announced above
our dual version of FCH is not implied by FAA even
when H1 and H2 are imposed:
Counterexample 1 The FAA does not imply the
fuzzy dual Chernoff condition (FDCH) even under
conditions H1 and H2. Consider the set X = {x, y}
and S the fuzzy subset of X satisfying S(x) = 0.5
and S(y) = 1 . Take B = {X,S, {x}, {y}} and the
choice function defined as follows. The choice func-
X S x y C(X) C(S) C(x) C(y)
x 1 0.5 1 0 1 0.5 1 0
y 1 1 0 1 0.5 1 0 1
Table 1: Choice function corresponding to Coun-
terexample 1. Brackets have been omitted.
tion C satisfies H1, H2 and the FAA but I(S,X) =
1 and I(C(S), C(X) ∩ S) = 0.5 .
Counterexamples 2 and 3 below prove that even
if conditions WH1 and WH2 are imposed the Fuzzy
Arrow Axiom implies neither the fuzzy Superset
property nor the fuzzy Property γ.
Counterexample 2 The Fuzzy Arrow
Axiom does not imply the fuzzy super-
set property under conditions WH1 and
WH2. Consider the set X = {x, y, z} and
B = {X,T, S, {x, y}, {x, z}, {y, z}, {x}, {y}, {z}},
where T and S are defined in Table 2. Consider
the fuzzy choice function C also defined in Table 2 .
This choice function satisfies the Fuzzy Arrow
Axiom. Conditions WH1 and WH2 are also
satisfied, but C does not satisfy the fuzzy Superset
property: I(S, T ) = 1 and I(C(T ), C(S)) = 1 but
E(C(T ), C(S)) = I(C(S), C(T )) = 0.7 .
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X T S x, y x, z y, z x y z
x 1 0.9 0.9 1 1 0 1 0 0
y 1 0.7 0.6 1 0 1 0 1 0
z 1 0.7 0.7 0 1 1 0 0 1
C(X) C(T ) C(S) C(x, y) C(x, z) C(y, z)
x 0.7 0.7 0.9 1 0.7 0
y 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0 0.6
z 1 0.7 0.7 0 1 1
Table 2: Choice function corresponding to Coun-
terexample 2. Brackets have been omitted.
X T S1 S2 x, y x, z y, z x y z
x 1 0.9 0.9 0.6 1 1 0 1 0 0
y 1 0.9 0.6 0.9 1 0 1 0 1 0
z 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 1 1 0 0 1
C(X) C(T ) C(S1) C(S2) C(x, y) C(x, z) C(y, z)
x 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.5 0
y 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 1 0 0.5
z 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 1 1
Table 3: Choice function corresponding to Coun-
terexample 3. Brackets have been omitted.
Counterexample 3 The Fuzzy Arrow Axiom does
not guarantee the fuzzy Concordance property under
conditions WH1 and WH2. As a consequence it does
not guarantee the fuzzy Property γ either.
To prove it, consider the element x in the situa-
tion defined by Table 3. It suffices to check that
C(S1)(x) ∗ C(S2)(x) = min(0.9, 0.6) = 0.6 >
> 0.5 = C(T )(x)
in order to observe C(S1) ∗ C(S2) 6⊆ C(T ) .
In order to assess to which extent the Fuzzy
Arrow Axiom is related to the fuzzy Property γ
(resp., the fuzzy Superset property), Counterex-
ample 2 (resp., Counterexample 3) should be con-
trasted with Lemma 2 (resp., Lemma 3) below.
Lemma 2 Let C be a fuzzy choice function defined
on a domain B. If C satisfies the Fuzzy Arrow Ax-
iom and conditions H1 and H2 are verified, then it
satisfies the fuzzy Superset property.
Lemma 3 Let C be a fuzzy choice function defined
on a domain B. If C satisfies the Fuzzy Arrow Ax-
iom and conditions H1 and H2 are verified, then it
satisfies the fuzzy Property γ.
Only one extended implication from Figure 1 does
not hold true when conditions H1 and H2 are im-
posed in the fuzzy context: the fuzzy Property γ
does not imply the fuzzy Binariness property. The
following counterexample proves this assertion:
Counterexample 4 Consider the set X = {x, y}
and B = {X,S, {x}, {y}} where S is defined as in
Table 4. The choice function considered in that ta-
ble satisfies the fuzzy Property γ, but not the fuzzy
Binariness property. Observe that C(S)(x) = 0.5,
but
S(x) ∗ ∧y∈X(S(y)→ C({x, y})(x)) = 0.9 .
X S x y C(X) C(S) C(x) C(y)
x 1 0.9 1 0 1 0.5 1 0
y 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
Table 4: Choice function corresponding to Coun-
terexample 4. Brackets have been omitted.
The results proven in this section show that con-
ditions WH1 and WH2 are too weak if we want to
extend to the fuzzy context the connections between
the consistency conditions presented previously that
we had in the crisp case. Conditions H1 and H2 are
far more convenient to this purpose.
4. Sequential Choice and Consistency
In abstract choice theory there is growing attention
to non-standard decision mechanisms, especially the
case where the decision maker proceeds by sequen-
tial application of rational (in some classical sense)
criteria. Manzini and Mariotti [7] explain that it
permits to give support to experimental evidence
from psychology and marketing studies that con-
tradicts the standard maximizing paradigm. They
provide a simple example where a cyclical pattern of
choice is explained by an appealing sequential pro-
cedure in social choice proposed by Tadenuma [11].
Since cycles of choice are forbidden in the model by
maximization of well-behaved preferences, but ap-
pear in experiments on a regular basis, sequential
choice permits to incorporate such observations into
the axiomatic analysis. The question arises: What
choices can be explained by the sequential appli-
cation of rational choices? This is an issue where
other relevant studies include García-Sanz and Al-
cantud [5] (for multivalued choice) and the refer-
ences therein.
Needless to say, in order to study sequentially
rational choice the normative implications of such
mechanism must be investigated. The same is true
in the fuzzy variation of the model.
In view of this motivation we now proceed to in-
troduce the notion of sequential fuzzy choice as fol-
lows:
Definition 9 Let X be a set of alternatives and B
the set of all non-zero fuzzy subsets of X. Let C1, C2
be fuzzy choice functions defined on (X,B). Then
C1 ◦ C2 : B → F(X) such that for each S ∈ B,
(C1 ◦ C2)(S) = C1(C2(S)) ⊆ S is the sequential
application of C1 and C2, also called the sequential
fuzzy choice function C1 ◦ C2.
Similarly one can define the sequential application
of the fuzzy choice functions C1, . . . , Cn.
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For simplicity we have defined sequential applica-
tion of fuzzy choice functions defined on the whole
collection of non-zero fuzzy subsets of X. Never-
theless the sequential application of C1 and C2 can
be performed on domains other than this universal
class. For example, let F [X] be the collection of
non-zero fuzzy subsets of any crisp finite subset of
X, i.e., F [X] = {A ⊆ f [X] : A is non-zero }. Then
when C1 is defined on either (X,F [X]) or (X, f [X])
and C2 is defined on (X,F [X]) the sequential ap-
plication of C1 and C2 is well-defined too.
Remark 2 Consider a set of alternatives X and
let B be a subset of F(X) \ ∅. Let us recall that
given two sets S and T in B, if there is x ∈ X such
that S(x) > T (x) = α then I(S, T ) ≤ α and as a
consequence, E(S, T ) ≤ α.
Remark 3 Consider a finite set of alternatives X
and let B be a subset of F(X) \ ∅. If I(S, T ) =
α for some α < 1, then there exists at least one
element x ∈ X such that S(x) > α = T (x). As a
consequence, if E(S, T ) = α, then at least one of
the following two situations hold:
• there exists one element x such that S(x) >
α = T (x) ,
• there exists one element y such that T (y) >
α = S(y) .
Theorem 1 Let X be a finite set of alternatives
and B a non-empty subset of F\{∅}. Let C1, . . . , Cn
be a finite set of fuzzy choice functions defined
on (X,B). If C1, . . . , Cn satisfy the Fuzzy Ar-
row Axiom and the sequential fuzzy choice function
C1 ◦ · · · ◦ Cn is well-defined then C1 ◦ · · · ◦ Cn also
satisfies the Fuzzy Arrow Axiom too.
Georgescu [6, Theorem 6.38] establishes the
equivalence between FAA and the property that the
choice function is full-rational, under conditions H1
and H2 and for the minimum t-norm. This crucial
result permits to take advantage of Theorem 1 in
order to deduce that the sequential application of
full-rational fuzzy choice functions is full-rational,
i.e.:
Corollary 1 Let X be a finite set of alternatives
and B a non-empty subset of F\{∅}. Let C1, . . . , Cn
be a finite set of fuzzy choice functions defined on
(X,B) satisfying conditions H1 and H2.
If C1, . . . , Cn are full-rational then C1 ◦ · · · ◦ Cn
is full-rational too.
Corollary 1 is proven indirectly by the recourse to
Georgescu [6, Theorem 6.38] coupled with Theorem
1. However the researcher may need to avail herself
of an explicit procedure for actually rationalizing
the sequential application of rational fuzzy choice
functions. We now provide a solution to this issue
under the only requirement of G-rationality:
Corollary 2 Let us fix a set of alternatives X and
B a non-empty subset of F\{∅} satisfying condition
H2. Given two G-rational fuzzy choice functions
C1 and C2 with associated weak preference relations
R1 and R2, if C2 ◦ C1 is G-rational then the fuzzy
preference relation associated with the composition
of C1 and C2, C2 ◦ C1, is the relation
R12(x, y) = R1(x, y) ∗ (R1(y, x)→ R2(x, y)) .
Notice that the relation R12 associated with the
composition in Corollary 2 is a fuzzy version of a
lexicographic relation. Thus our explicit solution
has an intuitive natural interpretation. We empha-
size the fact that it does not require any additional
restriction on the type of rationality of the original
fuzzy choice functions, whereas Theorem 1 refers to
the full-rational case.
Remark 4 Georgescu [6, Definition 5.38] intro-
duces the concept of G-normal fuzzy choice func-
tion. In principle it establishes a particular form
of G-rationality where the fulfilment of the optimal-
ity condition must hold true for the fuzzy revealed
preference R ([6, Definition 5.16]). But because G-
rationality is equivalent to G-normality under the
minimum t-norm ([6, Proposition 5.40]) we trivially
derive: in the conditions of Corollary 2, C2 ◦ C1 is
G-normal; and R12 is the revealed preference asso-
ciated with C2 ◦ C1.
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5. Conclusion
The new concept of sequential application of fuzzy
choice functions may be a tool to escape paradoxi-
cal observed behaviors. For example, we have found
that there are fuzzy choice functions that do not
verify FCH but can be explained as the sequential
application of two G-rational fuzzy choice functions.
We have settled the basis for future investigations of
this idea. Many developments could be made in this
respect. For example, the exploration of which con-
sistency axioms ensure a consistent behavior at the
end of the sequential process, in line with Theorem
1. The interplay with other rationalizability ideas
like M-rationality is another possibility for research.
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